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CONFIDENTIAL--GDS

November 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

FBIS Coverage of South Asia

In examining overt intelligence reporting on South Asia and Central Asia I have been struck by the thinness of coverage of the politically relevant output of radio and press from this part of the world. I understand that FBIS some time ago developed a plan for a South Asian bureau which could help remedy this gap, focusing on the Indian subcontinent, "Afghanistan and Iran and on Soviet Central Asia. But I am told that FBIS's plans have been postponed until FY 1981 at the earliest. This seems to me to be a mistake.

The current crisis in Iran confronts us with the need to do everything we can to get more insight into what is happening in this whole area. Systematic exploitation of locallanguage broadcasts and newspapers in Soviet Central Asia might provide a better idea of Soviet capabilities and intentions toward Iran and Afhanistan, e.g. Rather than put off expansion of FBIS capabilities in this critical region, we should accelerate planning, find personnel with the needed language and analytical skills and shift funds, if necessary, to enable serious field surveys to begin immediately. The total cost for this kind of effort is small compared to the investment required for more sensitive technical collection capabilities.

Please review plans for development of this aspect of overtocollection and advise me by 30 November how they can be accelerated.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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April 2, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

SECRET

Augmenting FBIS's South Asian

Capabilities (U)

I have noted your memorandum of 21 March 1979 on this subject. While proposing an FBIS bureau in Pakistan is undesirable when we are pursuing the possibility of a fallback position for the lost Iranian sites, it does not seem to me that the two operations necessarily conflict. If the Pakistanis should prove cooperative on highly sensitive technical capabilities, I should think there might also be a fair chance that they might also agree to the much less politically sensitive establishment of overt monitoring capabilities. I recommend you at least keep this possibility open. (S)

Meanwhile, I urge you to take at least temporary measures to improve monitoring from the whole South and Central Asian area. The value of having this overtly obtainable information as rapidly as possible is even more obvious than it was when I sent you my memorandum of 14 November 1978. Instability and political ferment have meanwhile increased throughout the whole area, notably in Afghanistan and Iran, but also in Pakistan and in respect to the Kurdish issue which may come to affect countries such as Turkey and Iraq. We also continue to need more tibely coverage of broadcasts from the Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia and from the Soviet-Chinese border area. (S)

Please report by 1 May 1979 all measures you are able to take to improve FBIS coverage of all these targets. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: Sec of State

SECRET Review on 26 March 1983 Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP83-00714R000100040007-5

THE WHITE HOUSE

Executive Registry 79 - 6007/3

WASHINGTON

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SECRET Review on 26 March 1983

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